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Potential Bluetooth Vulnerabilities in Smartphones
Lih Wern Wong




Smartphone vendors have been increasingly integrating Bluetooth technology into their devices to
increase accessible and  convenience for  users.  As  the current inclination  of  integrating PDA and
telephony  increase,  the  likelihood  of  sensitive  information  being  stored  on  such  a  device  is  also
increased.  Potential  Bluetooth  vulnerabilities  could  provide  alternative  means  to  compromise
Bluetooth-enable  smartphones,  leading  to  severe  data  breaches.  This  paper  gives  an  insight  on
potential security vulnerabilities in Bluetooth-enabled smartphones and how these vulnerabilities may
affect  smartphone users.  This paper is  discussed from the viewpoint  of  Bluetooth weaknesses  and
implementation  flaws,  which  includes  pairing,  weak  key  storage,  key  disclosure,  key  database
modification, unit key weaknesses, manipulating sent data, locating tracking, implementation flaws,
disclosure of undiscoverable devices, denial of service, device-based authentication, and uncontrolled
propagation of Bluetooth waves, as well as Blueprinting and relay attacks.
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INTRODUCTION
Increasingly,  smartphones  are  used  as  a  portable  data  storage  and  may  potentially  be  used  as  a
repository for account PINs, passwords and other private personal information. The current trend of
integrating PDA and mobile phone technology into one device with Bluetooth add-on has increased the
volume and spectrum of data that may be stored, relative to the device capabilities. Thus, security
vulnerabilities on such devices may lead to more serious breach than would have been possible on a
traditional low storage mobile telephony device. Though Bluetooth technology has all the advantages
of  wireless  technology such as the ability  to  create  a  personal  area network  (a type of  local  area
network in Bluetooth), it exhibits new and less publicized weaknesses. 
Smartphone  manufacturers  usually  produce  their  Bluetooth-enabled smartphones  with lax security,
which could compromise the security of the information held on such devices (Schwartz, 2004, p. 10).
Bluetooth security is optional (Potter & Caswell, 2003). A common manufacturing default setting is to
place smartphones in discoverable mode which removes authorization, authentication and encryption
by default to increase the ease with which consumers may connect to accessories or other devices. 
PAIRING
Bluetooth devices are susceptible to active and passive attacks during pairing procedure which usually
occurs  once between two devices.  However such an attack is  only possible,  where  the attacker  is
present during pairing procedure (Jakobsson & Wetzel, 2001, p. 10). Thus the threat posed by pairing
is increased if such pairing is performed in public places such as a connection to an access point,
laptop or vending machine. This section illustrates the attacks based on combination key, which easily
apply to unit key as well. Combination key and unit key are two types of link keys that are used for
authentication and link encryption key generation purposes between Bluetooth devices. 
Pairing  between  devices  A  and  B,  as  detailed  in  Figure  1,  first  requires  the  establishment  of
initialization key, KINIT, which is calculated based on the above E22 algorithm, with input BD_ADDR
(Bluetooth device address), IN_RAND (random number) and PKEY (secret passkey or PIN). KAB is a
combination  key  which  is  not  transmitted  individually  through  the  air,  but  created  using  a  local
generated random value LK_RAND and it is exchanged via KINIT ⊕ LK_RAND. Since both parties
have a common understanding of KINT, they are able to derive the respective LK_RAND.
KINIT = E22(BD_ADDR, IN_RAND, PKEY)
KINIT ⊕ LK_RANDA   (A send to B)
KINIT ⊕ LK_RANDB   (B send to A)
KAB = E21(LK_RANDA, BD_ADDRA) ⊕ E21(LK_RANDB, BD_ADDRB)
SRES = E1(BD_ADDR_claimant, AU_RAND_verifier, KAB)
Figure 1: Algorithms in Pairing Procedure
 E1 is used in authentication phase using KAB, verifier AU_RAND and claimant BD_ADDR. During the
pairing procedure between device A and B, the attacker is able to collect the following information in
clear text over the air, as shown in Figure 2.
IN_RAND (random value)
BD_ADDRA (device A address)
BD_ADDRB (device B address)
KINIT ⊕ LK_RANDA (random value)
KINIT ⊕ LK_RANDB  (random value)
AU_RAND (random value)
SRES (authentication output)
Figure 2: Data Transmitted in Clear Text
After such an attack, the only unknown parameter in the computation of current link key (combination
key in this case) is the passkey. The attacker may then try a range of passkeys using the results to
calculate the corresponding SRES, and later verify with the observed SRES value offline. Such an
attack  would  be  likely  in  two  scenarios.  First,  attacker  passively  eavesdrops  all  the  above
communicated data between two pairing devices in clear.  Then, attacker  performs an offline brute
force  attack  on  a  range  of  passkey  and  verifies  the  correctness  of  the  passkey  by  matching  the
corresponding SRES’ with the received SRES value, without sending any data to the victims.
Alternatively, attacker can actively engage in a pairing procedure by first faking the device address.
After  the  establishment  of  link  key  using  a  guessed  passkey,  the  attacker  must  first  initiate  the
authentication procedure (perform sequentially) (Gehrmann, 2002, p. 7). Thus, the victim acting as the
claimant will send the corresponding SRES to the attacker (verifier). After obtaining the SRES, the
attacker uses brute force with a range of passkey values generated by calculating the corresponding
initialization key. Next, for each initialization key, the attacker calculates the subsequent combination
key, and then authenticate it locally using the obtained SRES (without interacting with victim) until a
correct passkey is found. 
The supposed ‘security feature’ in  the Bluetooth authentication process of waiting certain amount of
time  to  pass  (which  increases  exponentially  for  each  failed  attempt)  before  a  new authentication
attempt in such a scenario would actually benefit the attacker by allowing progressively more time to
compute the passkey on each attempt (Jakobsson & Wetzel, 2001, p. 11). Thus any smartphone using a
short  passkey for  secure  connection would be highly vulnerable to eavesdropping and man-in-the-
middle attacks during the pairing procedure (Kugler, 2003, p. 9). The tendency of users to select short
and easily identifiable passkeys serves to make this attack more feasible.
WEAK KEY STORAGE
As the Bluetooth specification does not specify how the Bluetooth host or controller should manage the
link key database in term of access control and secure storage (Gehrmann, Persson & Smeets, 2004, p.
62), it is likely that threats may arise due to improper key storage handling.
Keys Disclosure
In  most  smartphone  devices  the  key  database  is  stored  in  non-volatile  memory,  thus  making  the
acquisition of the database a non-trivial exercise. An attacker would require in-depth knowledge and
special equipment to access the memory.  However, in the case of smartphones which utilize external
Bluetooth CompactFlash or SDIO (SD Input/Output) adapter, acquisition of link keys becomes a lot
simpler though still requires physical access to the smartphones (Gehrmann, Persson & Smeets, 2004,
p. 110). If the keys are stored in plain text in the smartphone memory, attacker could replace the actual
Bluetooth adapter with a malicious adapter to retrieve the stored link keys using command HCI Link
Key Request with BD_ADDR as parameter. However, using this method the attacker is only able to
retrieve the link keys if there is a matching BD_ADDR.
Alternatively,  if  the  key  database  is  stored  in  the  module  (external  card)  instead  of  the  host
(smartphone), an adversary may simply remove the card and place it in another device and utilizing
software which issues the HCI Read Stored Link Key command to read out all the link keys and their
corresponding device addresses in the module (Bluetooth SIG, 2004, p. 480). Malware attacks are also
possible using a Trojan horse which could disguise itself as a benign application and secretly retrieve
the link key/address pairs and send it to adversary through various unprotected smartphone supported
communication channels.
Once the key database is compromised, the attacker may use the link key and the associate device
address (BD_ADDR) to effectively impersonate the actual device. For example, knowing the link keys
and  the  computer  Bluetooth  adapter’s  BD_ADDR the  smartphone  usually  associates  with,  allows
attacker to impersonate the computer and exploit the services the smartphone offers (e.g. make calls,
SMS) over Bluetooth.
Key Database Modification
Unauthorized access to  Bluetooth  device without  going  through proper  pairing  can be granted by
inserting or modifying link keys/address pairs in the key database. Thus rather than impersonating an
existing pairing, an attacker could connect to a victimized smartphone using an inserted entry in the
key database. If the link key is associated with a device marked as trusted, the attacker may use its now
trusted  BD_ADDR  and  obtain  unrestrictive  access  to  all  Bluetooth  services  on  the  victimized
smartphone (Karygiannis & Owens, 2002, p. 76).
This is further compounded by the Bluetooth specifications lack of procedures for the detection of a
corrupted key database and lack of database integrity checking. Thus, if an attacker were to corrupt the
keys database by altering all the link keys/address pairs, the device will then fail to authenticate with
previously paired devices. This is further compounded as every time the devices fails to authenticate an
increasing delay of service due to incremental waiting interval for repeat authentication attempts. To
overcome this, the user will be required to reinitiate a new pairing and thus risk further attacks.
UNIT KEY
A unit key is usually used in devices that have limited memory availability such as Bluetooth mobile
headsets, although Bluetooth 1.2 has withdrawn the  use of unit key, the feature has been left in many
devices to allow backwards compatibility with older Bluetooth devices (Bluetooth SIG, 2003, p. 79).
However the use of a unit key as shared secret between two devices opens up more vulnerabilities in
already insecure devices (Vainio, 2000). Unit keys are unique to each device and are usually never
changed as devices utilizing a unit key are only able to use one shared key for all secure connection
with other trusted devices. 
An example would be the communication between device A (e.g. victim’s smartphone) and B (e.g.
headset) which communicate using A’s unit key as their link key. If device C (e.g. attacker’s laptop)
has previously communicated with device A, it will already possess the unit key which may then be
utilized to eavesdrop on communication between devices A and B. Attackers  might  also use such
knowledge to impersonate device B, or at worst perform man-in-the-middle attack. Consequently, unit
key is unable to protect device issuing the unit key against attack from any trusted device. 
MANIPULATING SENT DATA
An attacker may send erroneous data to the receiver by inserting or modifying the data originally sent.
In situations where encryption is not present, attackers may easily modify the actual user data and its
corresponding CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) in the packet’s payload field to create meaningful and
effective  changes  that  might  go  unnoticed  by  receiver  (BSI,  2003,  p.  7).  While  posing  greater
difficulty, encrypted data may still be modified through the use of a newly computed CRC value which
agrees with modified data, as the encryption and CRC computation are linear operations (Gehrmann,
Persson & Smeets, 2004, p. 105). However such manipulation on encrypted payloads will only disrupt
the Bluetooth communication, without actually allowing significant changes on end-user data.
LOCATION TRACKING
With the integration of Bluetooth technology into personal mobile devices which are carried around by
their owners such as smartphones, PDA’s or laptops, the location privacy of users comes under threat.
A Bluetooth-enabled  device  carried  and  used  by  a  person  may be  tracked  using  the  radio  signal
transmitted from the device. Once the attacker  is able to associate the device identity (e.g. unique
Bluetooth  device  address  or  non-unique  device  friendly  name)  with  the  actual  user  identity,  user
movement may be tracked The long promised anonymity mode (Kewney, 2003) which was introduced
to mitigate such attack by having changeable device address (Graham, n.d.), was not mature enough to
be included in latest Bluetooth 2.0 specification.
Inquiry Attack
Bluetooth device address (BD_ADDR) is best used to uniquely identify a Bluetooth-enabled device.
Attacker could exploit existing public access Bluetooth infrastructure or deployed numerous Bluetooth
devices in a targeted area to pinpoint users’ location. Suppose victim device is set to discoverable
mode, attacker can frequently perform inquiry scan to discover Bluetooth-enabled device and log all
device addresses that are discovered with time associated. The logs would reveal users movement and
possible their association (i.e. relation exist between two people who frequently gather at the same
area) (Gehrmann, Persson & Smeets, 2004, p. 115). 
Traffic Monitoring Attack
Even devices in non-discoverable mode may be located through the monitoring of  communication
between devices. All packets in Bluetooth traffic has an access code field which value is derived from
the master device address in the piconet, called channel access code (CAC). Receivers use CAC to
identify  packets  that  belong  to  the  corresponding  piconet.  Thus,  by  monitoring  traffic  in  an  area,
attacker can determine the existence of master devices. Though CAC is not unique, the existence of
two devices having the same CAC in a small area is rare (Gehrmann, Persson & Smeets, 2004, p. 115).
While FHS (frequency hopping sequence) packets or packets with DAC (device access code) value can
be monitored to also determine an individual device, such methods are not as effective as CAC as they
are only used during connection establishment.
Paging Attack
When  a  device  is  in  connectable  mode,  attacker  could  page  a  particular  BD_ADDR or  DAC to
determine if the device is within range, without responding back (Jakobsson & Wetzel, 2001, p. 12).
The paged device is found if the device response to the paging request. The victimized device will then
timeout without alerting the user that no response was received.
Frequency Hopping Attack
The Bluetooth frequency hopping scheme is a repeating frequency hopping sequence, determined by
master device address and clock. In paged state, the LAP (lower address part, 24-bit) and four LSB
(least significant bit) in UAP (upper address part) of the paged device BD_ADDR (48-bit) is used. In
connection state, the LAP and four LSB in UAP of master device (i.e. paging device) BD_ADDR is
used. Theoretically, attacker could monitor the frequency hopping scheme and determine the LAP and
four LSB in UAP (Gehrmann, Persson & Smeets, 2004, p. 116). Thus, partial (28-bit out of 48-bit) of
the master device BD_ADDR can be acquired throughout the connection state, while acquiring partial
of the slave device BD_ADDR during paging state.
User-friendly Name Attack
After the completion of paging procedure,  an attacker could request nearby devices for their user-
friendly name to locate the victim device, assuming that a fairly unique user-friendly name is defined
on the victim device. This attack requires the victim device to be in a connectable state (i.e. could be
paged).
IMPLEMENTATION FLAWS
Some aspects of Bluetooth security, such as security policy enforcement, key database management
and others, which contribute to the overall device security, are not assessed vigorously by smartphone
vendors  as  they  are  not  mandated  in  the  current  Bluetooth  specification.  Such  oversight  might
potentially lead to defective implementations, such as the following Bluetooth vulnerabilities.
BlueSnarf
BlueSnarf allows an adversary to connect to a Bluetooth-enabled device without going through normal
pairing,  and subsequently  access stored  data such as phonebook  information  (e.g.  data and image
related with an individual entry), calendar details, real-time clock settings, stored business cards and
IMEI, (International Mobile Equipment Identity) without alerting the owner (Laurie & Laurie, 2004).
Actual field assessment in CeBIT 2004 confirms such BlueSnarf attack (Herfurt, 2004). This attack is
feasible on flawed devices regardless of discoverable mode.
In order to perform BlueSnarf attack, the attacker first needs to connect to the OBEX Push Profile
(OPP). OBEX Push is a service that usually does not require authentication (though OBEX is capable
of managing authentication) to ensure proper implementation and it is commonly used for business
card exchange or uploading and retrieving other similar objects. Attacker could possible exploit such
vulnerability  via IrDA or  serial  port  as this attack or  vulnerability  is  unrelated  to OBEX protocol
(Rowe & Hurman, 2003).
OBEX vulnerabilities can be approached through GET and PUT, which refer to object retrieval and
uploading  respectively.  Attacker  connects to the OBEX Push recipient  and issues  an OBEX GET
request  to  potential  vulnerable  smartphone  to  retrieve  all  files  with  known  or  correctly  guessed
filename,  such  as  'telecom/pb.vcf'  for  the  devices  phonebook  or  'telecom/cal.vcs'  for  the  devices
calendar file (refer IrMC Specification for standard filenames) (BlueSnarf, 2004). Usually, such files
are only accessible through protected profile. However, improper implementation causes them to be
accessible via unprotected profile such as OBEX Push. Alternatively, attack could push a PUT request
with  empty  body,  which  refers  to  DELETE action  in  OBEX.  By  pushing  the  request  to  target’s
phonebook entries,  it  will potential overwrite or  remove the phonebook entries (Rowe & Hurman,
2003).
A slight variation of BlueSnarf called BlueSnarf++ exists, which allows attacker to have full read/write
access to vulnerable device file system by connecting to the OBEX Push Profile. Instead of the simple
OBEX Push function, these flawed smartphones’ allows attacker to connect to the OBEX File Transfer
Profile  as  OBEX  Push  without  pairing  (BlueSnarf++,  2004).  This  allows  attacker  to  view  and
manipulate  the files  in  the file  system including  external  memory  sources,  such as  SD cards  and
memory sticks.
Backdoor Attack
Flawed implementation allows some smartphones to leave credential information on a device even
though the previous pairing  information has been removed  from the victim’s list  of  paired  device
(Laurie  & Laurie,  2004).  Full  access  to the device is  still  granted according  to  the previous trust
relationship without the owner’s knowledge as the pairing entry is invisible to the user. An attacker
could secretly  pair  the devices,  and deliberately  delete the pairing  entry,  while  still  having  covert
access  to  the  victimized  device.  Aside  from retrieving  or  manipulating  smartphone  data,  potential
services  attacker  could  access  without  victim consent  include  modem,  WAP and  GPRS services.
Unless  user  is  observing  their  smartphone  and  notices  the  small  icon  indicating  an  established
Bluetooth connection, the user would be unaware of the unauthorized access.
BlueBug 
BlueBug is a device security flaw that allows an attacker to issue AT (ASCII Terminal) commands to
vulnerable smartphone via Bluetooth without alerting the user. AT command set is commonly used to
configure and control communication devices like modems.  If successful, the adversary will have
application level control over the smartphone. An adversary could exploit AT commands to make and
divert  calls,  manipulate  phonebook,  update  calendar,  send/read/delete  SMS,  connect  to  Internet,
configure phone settings and so forth (BlueBug, 2004).
For instance, call forwarding allows attacker to intercept or impersonate the victim by diverting all
victim incoming calls to attacker. Some service providers allow user to track their customers’ location
through GSM cell networks, after seeking permission from the customers, which is usually obtained
via SMS, as an attacker controls the victim’s phone and they may approve the request without the
users’ knowledge (BlueBug, 2004). 
Attacker could use the smartphone as bug to eavesdrop on conversations which take place around the
phone by instructing the smartphone to make a call over GSM network to the attacker (e.g. using
anonymous  prepaid  phone  number)  which  may  situated  anywhere.  Furthermore,  victimized
smartphones could be instructed to call a premium number service which the attacker has affiliation
with, causing serious financial lost to the victims.
Various  vendors  implement  Bluetooth  stack  poorly,  they  create  some  unpublished  service  in
RFCOMM channel, which is not available in Service Discovery Profile (SDP). Attacker can connect to
unpublished headset service via RFCOMM without pairing (Laurie, Holtmann & Herfurt, 2005). 
Bluejacking
Bluejacking allows users to send anonymous business card or phonebook contact to Bluetooth-enabled
smartphone in discoverable mode. It is achieve using OBEX protocol object push feature.  Attacker
creates a phonebook contact with flirtatious message in the “name” field and broadcast it in crowded
area.  Fortunately,  this attack does not modify or delete any smartphone stored data, but annoys or
harasses user with unsolicited flirtatious message rather then usual name and phone number business
cards they would expect. A Bluejacker usually send more personal messages if the victim responses.
Vendors can use such vulnerability as a marketing tool to post advertisement. However, an attacker
could possible send business card which may overwrite the existing phonebook entry having the same
name to unaware victims, hoping they would blindly accept the entry, for example replacing “home”
entry with premium rate number (Whitehouse, 2004).
Another variation of Bluejacking exploits the pairing procedure in which Bluetooth devices establish a
secure connection. This attack is feasible as the “name” of the attacker device initiating the pairing is
display to the target device as part of the pairing procedure, and the name field allows text up to 248
characters, enough for the attacker to construct a meaningful message (Laurie & Laurie, 2004). Most
users would probably be careful enough not to complete the pairing with unknown devices. While such
Bluejacking  may  seem rather  benign,  and  not  much  of  a  real  security  threat  aside  from causing
annoyance,  attacker  could  deceive unwitting user  by  constructing tempting message.  For  instance,
message like “You have won $ 20,000 in XXX draw! Enter this 4 digits PIN and call 09-64323456 to
collect  the prize!”  would likely be successful  in deceiving targets  to complete the pairing  without
raising much suspicion. Consequently, if the pairing is successful, services or data on the device will
be accessible to the attacker. 
BlueSmack
BlueSmack is a Bluetooth version of “Ping of Death” (BlueSmack, 2004). It utilized L2CAP layer’s
L2CAP ping (echo request) which is used to check connectivity and connection roundtrip time. This
attack attempts to overwhelm the vulnerable device by sending large ping packets without requiring an
open L2CAP channel, which could possibly cause buffer overflow or denial of service attacks (Laurie,
Holtmann & Herfurt, 2005). Since L2CAP signal MTU is unspecified, attacker can customize the ping
packets size (Bluetooth SIG, 2004, p. 57).
DISCOVERY OF UNDISCOVERABLE DEVICES
Even device in non-discoverable mode can be located using tools like @Stake’s RedFang. RedFang
operating in multithread environment, utilizing up to 8 Bluetooth adapters could reduce the 11 hours in
single threat computation to approximately 90 minutes (Whitehouse, 2003, p. 8). Since a device must
align to the correct hopping pattern to be able to communicate with a BD_ADDR, the operation takes
considerable amount of time. Though non-discoverable device does not broadcast it present (i.e. does
not respond to inquiry scan request), it does response to certain request. Devices in non-discoverable
mode  response  to  direct  name  and  services  inquiry  request,  as  non-discoverable  authenticated  or
bonded devices require some sort of mechanism to update services and name (Whitehouse, 2003, p. 6).
Attacker will have to brute force through the device BD_ADDR to make name and services inquiry
request  to  discover  invisible  devices.  Only  the  24-bit  LSB of  BD_ADDR is gone  through,  while
keeping the 24-bit MSB of BD_ADDR fixed to a particular manufacturer, since it is unique for each
Bluetooth interface manufacturer (Potter & Caswell, 2003).
DENIAL OF SERVICE (DoS)
As  previously  mentioned  Bluetooth-enabled  smartphones  are  particularly  susceptible  to  the  DoS
attacks.  Constant  inquiring  or  requesting  response  from the receiving  smartphone  will  degrade  its
battery (Singel´ee & Preneel, 2004). After an attack, a user may be unable to use their smartphone
since the attack has drained off the battery completely. 
Another possible scenario for a DoS would be to overwhelm the smartphone with invalid Bluetooth
packets by the clogging communication channels, the owner could temporarily be refused of other
Bluetooth services.  Bluetooth physical communication link are used by two logical channels,  SCO
(Synchronous  Connection-Oriented)  and  ACL  (Asynchronous  Connection-Oriented).  Additionally,
Bluetooth  device  supports  a  maximum  number  of  simultaneous  active  connections  with  2Mbps
bandwidth in current Bluetooth 2.0. To clog up the bandwidth, attacker could impersonate a trusted
device and paired with the victimized smartphone and make request without acknowledgement for the
recipient of packets. The smartphone will retransmit asynchronous data that transport over ACL link
once the acknowledgement of recipient is not received. Thus, using multiple devices and requesting
large amount of asynchronous data, attacker could potentially deny the smartphone from serving other
devices,  since  the  ACL  link  is  constantly  retransmitting  data.  In  the  case  of  maximum  7  active
connections,  attacker  could impersonate all  7 slave devices and occupy the victimized smartphone
(master)  with  bogus  traffics.  Consequently,  other  devices  that  wish  to  connect  to  the  victimized
smartphone will be forced to switch to parked state while still synchronize with the master (Bluetooth
SIG, 2004, p. 45). Thus, attacker could consume all the bandwidth and maximum active connections to
cause DoS (Niem, 2002, p. 17)
Since there is a waiting interval after each failed authentication before a new attempt can be made,
attack can exploit it to cause denial of service. Bluetooth-enabled device (verifier) kept a list of devices
that failed the authentication procedure, which is defined by the claimant BD_ADDR. Attacker could
impersonate a target device (claimant) DB_ADDR by changing attacker device DB_ADDR and send
erroneous  authentication  response  to  verifier.  The  verifier  will  disregard  the  SRES value  (though
correct)  sent  by  the  victimized  claimant  after  receiving  the  erroneous  SRES sent  by  the  attacker
(assuming attacker sent its SRES faster than the victim’s SRES), and fail the authentication (Candolin,
2000). Thus, the victimized device would be prevented from authenticating itself to the verifier.
DEVICE-BASED AUTHENTICATION
Bluetooth security architecture only provides device-based authentication without user-based access
control (Karygiannis & Owens, 2002). In most cases, user does not have to authenticate himself to the
Bluetooth  module  (user  only  need  to  authenticate  himself  to  the  smartphone  if  user-based  access
control is activated). Basically, attacker will just have to impersonate target smartphone’s DB_ADDR
by changing attacker own’s BD_ADDR to gain access to devices the target smartphone has previously
paired with. It could cause problem to smartphone that support  external  Bluetooth adapter.  Attack
could simply steals the adapter and use it on other devices to gain access to devices the adapter has
previously paired with,  without initiating a pairing (assuming link key/address pairs information is
stored in the adapter). 
UNCONTROLLED PROPAGATION OF BLUETOOTH WAVE
Use of  high-gain directional  antenna or  standard  2.4GHz 802.11  and amplifier  to  boost  the weak
Bluetooth signal allows eavesdropping from a distance greater than the usual range (Cheung, 2005). If
the traffic is not encrypted, attacker will be able to learn the transmitted user data from far without
raising any suspicion. Bluetooth transmission power control is optional and most smartphones do not
support such feature. Thus, the usual short Bluetooth range transmitted by most smartphones (Class 2
device with up to 10 meters) does not actually protect users from eavesdropping. Besides, using high-
gain antenna, attacker will have more time (as users is still within the receiving and transmitting range
after moving more than 10 meters) to perform attacks at a much safer distance.
For instance, from far,  attacker  could transmit low-level jamming signal to disrupt the connection,
causing a reconnection between victim’s smartphone and external  keyboard. By eavesdropping the
pairing  procedure,  attacker  could  possible  calculate  the  passkey  and  subsequently  record  every
keystroke (Schwartz, 2004, p. 10). 
BLUEPRINTING
Every  Bluetooth-enabled  device  has  unique  attribute  (e.g.  device  address),  including  manufacture
specific  (e.g.  first  24-bit  MSB of  BD_ADDR)  and  model  specific  attributes  (service  description
records).  Blueprinting  is  a  technique  to  obtain  such  device  information  to  determine  the  device
manufacturer, model type, and even firmware version on some smartphones. Blueprinting is Bluetooth
version fingerprinting. Attacker can use Blueprinting to uncover potential vulnerable smartphones. 
Bluetooth-enabled  device  address  is  a  48-bit  identifier  similar  to  MAC  address  (e.g.
MM:MM:MM:NN:NN:NN). The first  half of the address refers  to Bluetooth chipset  manufacturer,
which usually identifies the device manufacturer (IEEE, 2005). However, the last 24-bit is randomly
assigned by manufacturer,  which give no notation of device model. Fortunately, Service Discovery
Protocol (SDP) profile can be used to refine the identification. Remote devices query SDP to enquire
services offered by a Bluetooth-enabled device, and how to utilize the respective services. Thus, by
hashing certain values in the SDP Profile response and calculating a fingerprint value, attacker can
associate the value to respective device model (Blueprinting, 2004).
According to the Bluetooth specification, all Bluetooth devices has Service Record Handle field, a 32-
bit number that uniquely identifier each service with SDP server during device startup. The Record
Handle value in a smartphone is hard coded within firmware.  RFCOMM channel or  L2CAP PSM
number that the service can be accessed under is also included in computing the hash. Part  of the
Blueprinting  hash includes the sum of Record  Handle value multiplied by channel for  all  running
services  on  the  smartphone  (e.g.  (RecHandle1*Channel1)  +  (RecHandle2*Channel2)  +...+
(RecHandlen*Channeln))  (Herfurt  &  Mulliner,  2004).  Thus,  Blueprinting  uses  combination  of
manufacture  part  of  BD_ADDR  and  actual  fingerprint  (i.e.  hash  value)  as  identifier  (e.g.
00:60:57@2621543 , fingerprint for Nokia 6310).
RELAY ATTACK
In  relay  attack,  attacker  C  communicates  with  A  impersonating  as  B,  and  communicate  with  B
impersonating as A. Relay attack is quite similar to man-in-the-middle attack, however, attacker does
not need to know the passkey or link key. Attacker basically relays message between A and B without
modifying the contents. Relay attack is only possible if victims A and B employ only device-based
authentication without application level authentication or encryption (Levi, Cetintas, Aydos, Koc, &
Ufuk,  2004,  p.  10).  Attacker  C  could  switch  between  the  role  of  AC and  BC by  impersonating
respective devices BD_ADDR. 
C must wait for actual connection request from either A or B. Suppose A wants to connect to B by first
paging BC, thinking it was B, as shown in Figure 3. Meanwhile, AC pages B to complete the paging
procedure. A sends LMP_host_connection_req command, which is relay by BC to B. AC accept the
connection request response from B and relay it to A through BC. In this connection establishment, C
must respond faster to the A’s paging request than B, so that A will connect to C instead of B (Kugler,
2003,  p. 3). AC must use a different  frequency hopping sequence from A so that A and B cannot
discover  each  other  (Device  that  initiates  paging  is  the  master,  who  determine  piconet  frequency
hopping sequence).
The changing of link keys does not affect the attack. C basically has to relay the encrypted random
value (RAND_NR) between A and B to complete the calculation of combination key. In authentication
phase, C relays the challenge (AU_RAND) and response (SRES) between A and B to complete the
authentication. Thus, A thinks B is authenticated, but it is actually BC that is authenticated. Similarly,
B thinks A is authentication, which is actually AC. Thus, since C is able to relay traffic between A and
B, it could possible cause DoS by delaying or stop the relaying process.
Figure 3: Relay Attack (Levi, Cetintas, Aydos, Koc, & Ufuk, 2004, p. 4)
CONCLUSION
Most Bluetooth-enabled smartphones has default lax security settings to increase the ease of which
consumers can connect to accessories or devices. Moreover, most users are unaware of the potential
risk associated with such devices or are not knowledgeable on the customization of Bluetooth settings.
Such factors have caused some of the potential vulnerabilities or attacks discussed above very viable
on  smartphones.  Potential  abuses  in  smartphones  will  increase  with  the  introduction  of  Wi-Fi
technology in smartphones, as Wi-Fi offers greater wireless range and bandwidth when compared to
Bluetooth. Smartphones users need to be made aware of the potential risk associated with such devices.
As  the  adoption  of  Bluetooth-enabled  smartphones  increases,  so  will  the  potential  risk.  While
Bluetooth technology does introduce some threats to users devices, users should always practice some
basic safety procedures when using such devices which will significantly mitigate the potential risk.
Such  procedures  include  switching  off  Bluetooth  functionality  whenever  not  in  use,  employ
authentication and encryption whenever possible, and never pair with unknown devices. Thus, until
Bluetooth SIG introduces and enforces more robust and secure security mechanism and smartphone
manufacturers  produce  more  secure  smartphones,  smartphone  users  should  always  use  Bluetooth
communication with caution.
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